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ABSTRACT
Many applications envisioned for ultra-high-speed
networks require cryptographic transformations for
data in transit. Security has often been an afterthought, and cryptographic support has generally
not kept pace with performance increases in other
network components. Two distinct experimental
prototypes of high-speed DES boards were built to
understand architectural issues in providing cryptographic support for the AURORA gigabit testbed.
Combining cryptographic support with the
hostfnetwork interface is indicated.

1. Introduction

Network usage and capabilities are both increasing
at terrific rates. The traffic load on the NSFnet
backbones in the United States doubles every few
months; much of this is due to the increased connectivity provided by interconnection with other
networks, large numbers of personal workstations
connected to LANs, and large numbers of computers connected via 9600 bit per second (bps) dial-ins.
Much of this traffic is "traditional" Internet traffic,
e.g., electronic mail, netnews, and file transfer,
although a significant percentage of traffic is due to
remote terminal sessions via rlogin and telnet. Network capabilities are increasing in a number of
ways. Most important of these is bandwidth, as
bandwidth can be spent to achieve a variety of other
quality-of-service (QOS) goals. In the very near
future, network technologies with bandwidths near
1 Gbps will be deployed in several areas of the
United States [I]. Research into associated technologies has been underway for several years.

1.1. Applications of Gigabit Networks

Among the applications envisioned for such networks are interactive teleconferencing, advanced
multimedia systems [15] with support for sensory
data such as tactile data, and advanced displays
with extremely high-quality imaging capabilities.
Many of these applications would not be possible
without large available bandwidths; while video
streams and images can be compressed, compression is only proportional to the underlying bit rate,
which can be enormous.
These applications are extremely attractive, as
they move us towards a world where remote medical diagnosis and robotic mining are possible, and a
world where jet lag may become less of an issue!
Many more applications can be imagined, and we
expect that many may become commercialized.

1.2. Securityffrivacy
Many proposed applications, however, will not be
feasible without significant attention paid to the
issue of security. The need for security, perversely,
is best illustrated by examples of what could happen
if it is lacking:
Medical images are transmitted through a
switched network, and poor administration of a
routing point allows the images to be perused.
Lung cancer is apparent on a particular set of
images; this data is reported to an insurance company for an anonymous bounty, and insurance is
refused for the imaged individual.
A Telerobotic command stream is altered to
introduce subtle defects into a competitor's products, e.g., automobile transmissions or VLSI

masks.
a Monitoring of weather prediction visualizations
allows foreign grain traders to buy US grain
futures at a price which hurts US markets after
the rains arrive.
Traditionally, security schemes relied on either
administrative means (e.g., systems with extremely
restricted access, careful monitoring and audits,
etc.) or cryptographic support, or some combination
of techniques.

in Hawthorne, NY
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Cambridge, MA
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The logical topology of AURORA is illustrated in
Figure 1.
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1.3. Cryptography

Since networks, by their nature, require distributed
control, cryptographic means have somewhat more
utility than solely administrative means to achieve
security. A detailed survey of cryptographic techniques is beyond the scope of this paper, but an
introduction is available in several books;
Denning's book [9] is quite accessible.
The major axes of choice are: choice of
encryption algorithm, hardware or software implementation, and placement in a networking architecture. Of the methods available which have withstood significant cryptographic attack, the Data
Encryption Standard [16] (DES) and the RivestShamir-Adleman [17] (RSA) schemes seem most
attractive. While the use of public-key technology
holds many seductions, the poor performance of
RSA implementations are a major problem. A
recent survey of hardware implementations of the
RSA algorithm[Brickell89] indicates that the fastest
available implementations are no faster than 1
Mbps; in fact, the fastest implementation reported
by Brickell operated at about 50 Kbps. Significantly faster implementations of the private-key
DES algorithm are available in hardware [lo, 13,
201 and architectural techniques for further improving its performance have been reported [4].
The remainder of this paper discusses the
Aurora Gigabit Testbed [6] and research into the
issue of appropriate cryptographic support.
2. The AURORAGigabit Testbed

AURORA [6] is an experimental wide area network
testbed whose main objective is the exploration and
evaluation of network technologies. The Gbps network will link four sites:
a Bellcore's Morristown Research and- Engineering Laboratory in Morristown, NJ
IBM Research's Computer Science Laboratory
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Figure 1: AURORALogical Topology

Each of the three lines from sites to central offices
in Figure 1 represents a logical OC- 12. The point
of this configuration is to first build independent
plaNET (plaNET is the follow-on to PARIS [5] )
and Sunshine [ l 11 networks. These independent
networks will be interconnected in order to understand interoperability of the technologies. Our host
interface [21] is intended for the Sunshine-ATM
logical topology.
The next three sections describe three designs
for high-performance cryptographic subsystems.
The fnst two have been implemented and the third
will be implemented soon.
3. Exploitation of Parallelism in a Custom DES
Design
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is the most
widely used publicly available secret-key algorithm. Since its introduction [16], DES implementations have improved in achieving high encryption
rates. Computer data communications rates have
also increased, and today's high-performance computer networks [I] further increase the encryption
bandwidth needed to avoid performance bottlenecks
in systems requiring security. Thus, architectural

rneans to increase DES throughput were studied,
with the intent of producing a DES implementation
io satisfy these bandwidth demands.
The key idea was to use the physical parallelism possible in a hardware realization to improve
performance without resorting to exotic technologies. When such parallelism can be exploited cheaply using architectural innovations, the exploratory
research would produce a useful artifact. The cryptographic subsystem was analyzed as a series of
levels, ranging from the basic combinational logic
of a single to the use of overlapped operation of the
host processor and the cryptographic subsystem.
The DES is implemented as sixteen "rounds" of
key-directed encipherment; each round implements
permutations and substitutions on the 64 bit input
using the 56 bits of key for selection of the particular transformation. The 64 bits of output of a round
are fed back as input for the next round until sixteen
rounds are achieved, at which point the 64 bits are
output.
At the combinational logic level, where a single round is implemented, the algorithm can be split
into several parallel computations for increased
speed. By generating subkeys one cycle in
advance, the time required can be effectively overlapped with the use of the subkey in the rest of the
round operation. An additional overlap can be
made of the two stages of exclusive-or (XOR) gates
at the expense of increased complexity and gatecount.
Use of multiple round implementations can
increase computation bandwidth if the DES mode
of operation chosen does not require feedback of
ciphertext [19], ruling out all but the Electronic
Code Book (ECB) method. Unfortunately, ECB is
known to be susceptible to plaintext frequencyanalysis based attacks since identical input blocks
result in identical output blocks. A proposed
operating method [14] resists this attack yet does
not require feedback of ciphertext. The basic idea
they propose is the use of sequence numbers
XORed into plaintext blocks in a feedforward mode
of operation. This produces a frequency-analyis
thwarting many-to-one mapping as well as eliminating dependencies introduced by chaining which
.
inhibit concurrent operation.
At the board level, concurrent I/O processing
and DES computation provides for steady-state
operation of the encryption unit. This can be
accomplished using double-buffering and a small
amount of extra logic. In addition to this buffering,

the use of Direct Memory Access (DMA) for the
encryption board allows the host processor to continue other work concurrently whatever the encryption unit is achieving.
One point worth a slight digression is the use
of replicated hardware for implementing rounds;
this provides an interesting range of
cost/performance relations where realizable.
3.1. Unrolling rounds into hardware

Computation elements may be configured to implement a fraction of the rounds in a "pipeline"-like
approach. The main idea is the conversion of the
iterative "rounds" of DES into a pipeline-like
stream processing structure, analogous to hardware
"loop unrolling". This can be accomplished by
tagging each 64 bit input with the 56 bit key with
which it undergoes the single-round transformation;
a round can effectively be thought of as a 120 bit
wide piece of combinational logic. A single-board
implementation of the DES requires that the 16
prescribed rounds of DES be performed on the 64bit data input and 56 bit key input before it is
presented as output. The 16 rounds mean that 16
passes through the internal data path of any implementation be performed. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 2:

XI
key rounds

Figure 2: Single-Board, 16 round DES
However, if one employs multiple boards, for
example four, as illustrated in Figure 3, one can
reduce the number of rounds performed by each
board. There is a small increase in the logic which
must employed to manage the keying, but this is a
second-order effect as far as performance is concerned. The primary relationship is this: up to a
maximum of 16 DES units (one per round), there is
a linear cost/performance tradeoff achievable by (1)
doubling the number of DES units, and (2) halving
the number of rounds each performs. For example,
Figure 3 shows four units each performing four
rounds. The upper limit is 16 units, each performing 1 round.

3.2. Summary and Implementation Experience
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Figure 3: Four DES units, 4 rounds per unit
Ignoring second order effects, the major delay is
induced by a round. Thus, as each "expansion"
takes place, the unit count is doubled, and the round
count is halved, meaning that the delay for the first
bit through the sixteen unit case is almost exactly
the same as the delay for the first bit through the
single unit case. That is, at each point on the costperformance line, from one unit to sixteen units, the
delay through the configuration is unchanged.
When keying needs to be updated frequently,
the pipeline style allows a matching of the datapath
flow with a parallel keypath. In this way, data
blocks are accompanied by their key throughout the
computation. Switching keys between successive
datablocks without flushing the pipeline is made
possible since the key and data streams are synchronized.
For infrequent key changes, the tradeoff in
keying interconnection may not be worthwhile as
compared to maintaining separate key registers for
each stage of the pipeline. Each round would then
maintain its own key load (shadow) register in this
approach. The standard's key shifting sequence
would be partially executed on each stage. Since a
partial execution of the key schedule would not
result in a complete cycling of the keytext, the key
would be reloaded from the shadow register when it
had completed its share of the computation on a
data block.
A limitation of the pipeline approach is the
bandwidth ceiling imposed by the number of rounds
in the algorithm, sixteen. This means that a single
pipeline of processors cannot provide more than
sixteen times the encryption bandwidth of a single
processor. Additionally, the pipeline suffers in scalability since the number of stages possible is restricted to be a factor of sixteen. This deficit is most
notable when considering an upgrade of a pipeline:
to gain any increase in bandwidth requires a doubling in computation resources.

Parallel aspects of the DES may be exploited at
three levels: within the algorithm kernel, through
duplication of the algorithm kernel, and in the
encryption processor I f 0 design. Maintaining constant throughput rates requires careful consideration
of the encryption system's interface or input/output
section. Overlap of the input, output and encryption
processes of subsequent text blocks provides high
throughput [23] Similarly, DMA support decouples
the host processor from the encryption function to
allow CPU processing of other tasks to proceed in
parallel with the encryption request [2].
We developed a DES board [3] using SSI TTL
and MSI PALS using the MUX key register
approach. Testing of a wirewrapped prototype with
a single algorithm kernel indicated an encryption
rate of 93 Mbps. An interface to the Micro Channel
Architecture bus of the IBM RISC System16000
was also implemented.
This implementation taught us a great deal
about the internal structure of the DES hardware
itself, and was a surprisingly successful design
exercise. Unfortunately, the parts cost of the implementation, potential performance limitations due to
packaging, and the large amount of handwork
required to replicate the work inhibited us. In addition, concurrently with the completion of the work
and experimental evaluation, very high-speed DES
chips were both implemented in research laboratories [lo] and announced to be commercially available [20]. The availability of such chips both
removed one of the motivations for implementing
the board (high performance), and enabled us to
redirect our energies towards architectural issues,
such as where the chip should be incorporated.
4. Current Scheme

Experience with the wire-wrapped board described
in Section 3 indicated that high encryption speeds
were possible, and that architectural solutions could
provide considerable leverage, independent of technology choices for the electronics. However, any
solution was intended for incorporation in our Gigabit testbed, and thus several replicas were necessary
for networking experiments, and the negatives
described above (complexity and handwork) were
thus even more important. VLSI Technology's
VM007 encryption chips [20] were chosen as the
basis for a Micro Channel Architecture bus card.
This chip has a number of important features,

111ostnotably the fact that it can be clocked at 30
Mhz, yielding Electronic Code Book (ECB) and
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) speeds of 192 Mbps.
This is entirely adequate for the current generation
host interface, which operates at OC-3c speeds (155
M~Ps).
A key can be loaded in 8 clock cycles, or
about 0.3 microseconds. Several registers for keying are provided.
The Micro Channel Architecture board has
been implemented and tested, and software support
has been written. It operates at rated speed, which
exceeds the maximum transfer rate (130 Mbps) possible between the host and Micro Channel Architecture devices with the current generation Micro
Channel Architecture I/O Channel Controller.
The major difficulty with this approach is the
number of bus transactions necessary to move data
to and from the network interface. This represents a
serious performance limitation due more to the
latency involved in roundtrips than in the bus
throughput. Section 5.2 discusses alternatives; the
nature of the traffic is illustrated in Figure 4

5.1. An ATM host interface
We have designed and implemented a prototype
ATM host interface [21] for the IBM RISC System16000. The host interface is implemented as a
pair of Micro Channel Architecture boards [7]. The
Segmenter board serves to convert data objects,
such as IP packets, to ATM cells. These cells are
then sent over the network. ATM cells are 48 bytes
of data plus 5 bytes of header, so that a reasonably
sized data object (say 8192 bytes) on the machine
requires many ATM cells to be put on the network
medium. The Reassembler board takes ATM cells
from the network and re-aggregates them into data
objects such as packets.
Among the functions the Segmenter and
Reassembler board provides are the computation of
CRC checksums, multiplexing and demultiplexing
of virtual circuits, and a small amount (64Kbytes)
of buffering. The model for the host interface's role
in a system is this: the host software makes any
control decisions, while the host interface performs
cellification, decellification, and any data movement to and from the host This significantly reduces
the burden on the workstation, as it is organized for
data processing, not memory manipulation.
-
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5. The right way

Our experience with the prototypes of Sections 3
and 4 leads us to believe that a truly highperformance encryption subsystem must be incorporated into the hosthetwork adaptor.

5.1.1. The Segmenter
A block dia.gram of the Segmenter is presented in
Figure 5. When data is to be transmitted into the
network, the virtual circuit identifier (VCI) to be
used is loaded into the header generator. A multiplexing identifier (MID) is also loaded into the
AAL generator if the data is to be transmitted via
the Class 4 ATM Adaptation Layer (AAU) [12].
The host then sets up a streaming mode [8] (an
optimized bus transfer mode for contiguous data)
transfer to move the data which is to be transmitted
from a pinned buffer in host memory to the FIFO
buffer on the Segmenter. The location and size of

host's buffer are specified during stream set-up.
While this transfer is being made, the Segmenter
produces the header check CRC and formats the
control information into the appropriate ATM and
AAL4 header formats. As soon as sufficient data
has been placed into the FIFO buffer, the segmentation controller removes the data for the first cell
from the FIFO buffer and adds an ATM header,
AAL4 header and AAL4 trailer. If the cell is carrying AAL4 data, the payload CRC is calculated as
the data is moved to the SONET framer [18] and
placed in the appropriate field at the end of the cell.
This process is repeated until the FIFO buffer is
drained.
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controller.
A reference resulting from the CAM lookup
operation is passed to the LLM. The LLM, as its
name suggests, establishes and maintains a linked
list data structure for each of the virtual circuit and
datagrams that is being received. Data received
from the network is placed at the end of the
appropriate list while data destined for host memory
is read from the front of the list.
The LLM allocates space in the DPRB for data
coming into the reassembler from the network and
passes the location to the DPRB controller. The
cell body which was placed into the FIFO by the
cell manager is removed and written into the
appropriate reasserrlbly buffer.
The host is able to read data from a particular
virtual circuit or datagram by specifying a list reference to the LLM which determines the location in
the DPRB where data is stored. The location is
passed to the DPRB controller which removes the
data from the buffer for transfer into host memory
over the MCA bus.

J

5.1.3. Discussion
Figure 6: Reassembler
5.1.2. The Reassembler

The Reassembler is illustrated in Figure 6. It is
composed of four major subsections which operate
concurrently. The cell manager, CAM lookup controller, and the linked list manager (LLM) exploit
this concurrency to form an ATM cell-processing
' 'pipeline' ' .
The cell manager verifies the integrity of the
header and payload (if the cell is carrying AAL4
data) of cells received from the network by the
SONET framer. It extracts the VCI from the ATM
header and the MID and length from the AAL
header. We currently ignore the 4-bit sequence
number in the AALA as we believe it is insufficient
to provide a reliable means for cell loss detection.
The body of the cell is placed in a FIFO buffer for
later movement into the dual port reassembly buffer
(DPRB).
The CAM lookup controller manages two
CAMS which provide lookup support for a total of
256 simultaneous virtual connections and the
reassembly of 256 datagrarns. The host is able to
flush undesired virtual circuits and datagrams from
the reassembler through the CAM lookup

Performance of our current architecture is quite
good; we can send and receive at about 130 Mbps,
measured by an AIX user process doing 110 to and
from the host interface. Detailed performance data
[22] is available.
5.2. Incorporating Cryptographic support:
alternatives

There are essentially two ways in which encryption
hardware can be employed. One method is to make
the encryption card generally available for access
on the Micro Channel Architecture bus, as was
done for the solutions of Sections 3 and 4. This has
the advantage that any application can employ the
encryption hardware, for example, to encrypt and
decrypt data written to disks, or to provide
application-to-application cryptographic support.
However, this approach (as illustrated in Figure 5 )
suffers from the need to access the bus multiple
times for each network transaction, e.g., data must
cross the bus to be encrypted, cross the bus after
they are encrypted, and if the post-encryption
transfer is to system memory, a third transfer (into
the host interface) is required (although this is not
strictly necessary on the Micro Channel Architecture as it supports card-to-card transfers). Since the
considerable bus activity will severely inhibit

rtetwork performance, this seems somewhat
undesirable.
The other alternative is to incorporate the
cryptographic hardware into the hostfnetwork interface. This is often used when link encryption is
desired, but has the drawback that the cryptographic
hardware is private to the interface. In addition,
link encryption itself has several drawbacks. First, it
provides little control for applications, e.g., for customized key choices. Second, it makes key management for arbitrary host-to-host encryption in a
switched network difficult; packet-switching exacerbates this problem since headers are encrypted
and must be readable if used for routing.
In the next section, we describe a solution
which combines some of the flexibility of the
separate card architectures with the highperformance characteristics of a link-encryption
solution.

Segmentation Controller

5.3. Incorporating Cryptographic Support: A
high-performance architecture

Figure 7: DES-augmented Segmenter
M

As shown in Figures 5 and 6, both the Segmenter
and Reassembler portion of the host interface are
broken into several functional blocks, which
operate concurrently. This hardware concurrency
permits high-performance solutions to be devised
using inexpensive technology choices. The
reassembler, in particular, makes great use of concurrency by setting up a "pipeline" which has four
logical stages. The architectures we propose are
illustrated in Figures 7 and 8.
The addition of the encryption chip in each case
serves to add another functional block, which can
operate concurrently with the other three blocks.
Key lookup is done by adding an extra field to the
"head-of-list" data structure in the pointer
memory. Extra space for such purposes was
reserved in the original interface design. These
"head-of-list" structures are located using the
CAM with the Virtual-Circuit Identifier as a tag.
The cryptographic keys are loaded into the VM007
in parallel with data movement from the Cell
Manager's data buffer into the Dual Port Reassembly Buffer. This solution provides the following
significant advantages:
1. Private keys for each virtual circuit (256 Virtual Circuits are currently supported in the host
interface).
2. Real-time ' 'agile' ' keying across Virtual
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(which ease transport through packet-switched
fabrics).
6. Conclusions

Unless workstation architectures change greatly,
cryptographic hardware should be incorporated into
the hosthetwork interface. This adds a marginal
amount of complexity to the interface and meshes
quite comfortably with functions it already performs, such as cellification, decellification, and
computing checksums. The advantages to this
approach stem from the fact that neither host
memory access nor bus transactions are required
beyond that necessary to move data from the application data areas to the hostlnetwork interface. Key
management is closely correlated with ATM header
manipulation, and can be performed efficiently with
the addition of a small amount of logic in the host
interface.
While we have used the DES algorithm to prototype our experimental solutions, our architectural
proposals are not dependent on its use; they relate
to the placement of cryptographic hardware in a
workstation connected to a high-bandwidth network. These architectural solutions do not stand in
the way of application-to-application ("end-toend") privacy, under the assumption that the
workstation operating system is a "trusted" subsystem. Distinct keys can be loaded for each ATM virtual circuit (i.e., each application).
Many high-bandwidth applications require
security, especially privacy. These requirements
will drive transformations in workstation architectures, especially high-performance communications
subsystems. Our proposal suggests an engineering
approach which is both extremely cost-effective
and provides high performance, while sacrificing
little in flexibility.
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